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INTRODUCTION 
Natural Right and the Failure to Calculate: The Paradox of the Slave 
 
The aim of this thesis is to draw attention to the paradoxical formulation of the slave in Chapter 
16 of the Theological-Political Treatise. Spinoza begins this chapter by defining right as co-
extensive with power. The right of each individual thing is then an expression of its power, 
mediated by the power of Nature as a whole. The critical import of this is that no one can 
renounce their right. This extends to each individual’s capacity to calculate their utility. Thus, 
everyone seeks their own advantage. This principle stands or falls on the claim to always be in 
operation. However, Spinoza includes the slave as a figure who lacks precisely this capacity. 
The slave is defined as one who is submitted to an external judgement an thus ‘cannot see or 
do what is good’. 
We can begin to extrapolate the slave by noting its historical peculiarity. This can be extracted 
by understanding what the slave is not. Indeed, Spinoza’s characterisation of the slave departs 
from a tradition that stretches back to Aristotle’s Politics, in which the slave (doulos) is defined 
in relation to a social hierarchy that necessitates its exclusion from citizenship. For Aristotle, 
the natural slave (as opposed to its conventional counterpart) “is entirely without the faculty of 
deliberation”.1 The slave is thus naturally predisposed to be ruled because it does not share in 
the goodness that is conducive to civic participation. This hierarchical model necessities the 
exclusion of those considered unfit for politics. Etienne Balibar refers to this as the ancient 
epoch, in which the citizen is “subordinated to anthropological differences”.2 This is followed 
by the modern epoch, which opens the “right to politics to all humans”.3 Has the modern epoch 
supplanted its ancient counterpart? Balibar suggests that these epochs persist in a “disunified 
totality, in a non-contemporaneity that is the very structure of the ‘current moment’”.4 Is the 
slave’s failure to calculate coeval with this ‘current moment’, an ineliminable limit and 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 35.                                           
2 Etienne Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, 
trans. James Swenson (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 59.  
3 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, p. 59. 
4 Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, p. 59. 
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condition of the political? With this mind, lets us draw out the significance of this in relation 
to Spinoza’s unique formulation of natural right.  
In Chapter 16 of the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza gives us a definition of natural 
right (jus naturale): “each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything that it can 
do, or the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power extends.”5 In other words, 
one’s right (jus) is co-extensive with one’s power. This power is continually mediated within 
the immanent power of Nature as a whole. But to really grasp the radicality of this correlation, 
between jus and potentia, one cannot separate Spinoza’s metaphysics from his politics. This 
has become a key point of departure for writers such as Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri.6 
The insistence on this interpretation renders the absolute transfer of natural right inconceivable. 
In this way, the fiction of an imaginary power is substituted for the actuality of a delimited 
power. Spinoza’s metaphysics thus dictates that what one can effectively do, their capacity to 
act (potentia agendi) is either enhanced or diminished within a network of affectual relations. 
I refer to this is as Spinoza’s immanent politics.     
The capacity to persist and increase one’s power is inseparable from the seeking out of means 
conducive to this end. This takes us to the heart of Spinoza’s formulation of subjectivity which, 
by way of showing itself, will allow us to elicit the heart of the paradox. In Proposition 65, Part 
4 of the Ethics, Spinoza explicates the principle through which reason compels each individual 
to seek their utility.7 This is prefigured in Chapter 16 of the Theological-Political Treatise: 
It is a universal law of human nature that no one neglects anything that they deem good 
unless they hope for a greater good or fear a greater loss, and no one puts up with anything 
bad except to avoid something worse or because he hopes for something better. That is, 
of two good things every single person will choose the one which he himself judges to 
be the greater good, and of two bad things he will choose that which he deems to be less 
bad. (TTP, 198) 
                                                          
5 Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan 
Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 195. Hereafter cited in-text with 
abbreviation (TTP).  
6 See Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1991), also Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990). 
7 Benedictus de Spinoza, “Ethics”, trans. Samuel Shirley, in ed. Michael L. Morgan, Complete Works: 
Spinoza (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), p. 354. Hereafter cited in-text with 
abbreviation.   
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This principle is a central tenet in the materialist tradition, and can be traced back to Book 6 of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in which the faculty of phronesis refers to our capacity to 
judge according to contingent circumstances.8 The calculation of utility forms the bedrock of 
Spinoza’s political thought, positioning his metaphysics and politics in relation to an 
anthropological account of how the human constantly relates to its environment by making 
judgements as to what can increase its capacity to act. It is a principle that “may be included 
among the eternal truths that no one can fail to know.” (TTP, 198) 
Yet, Spinoza defines the slave as one who cannot see or do what is good for him:  
Anyone who is guided by their own pleasure […] and cannot see or do what is good for 
them, is him or herself very much a slave. The only [genuinely] free person is one who 
lives with his entire mind guided solely by reason. Acting on command, that is, from 
obedience, does take away liberty in some sense, but it is not acting on command in itself 
that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason so for acting. If the purpose of the 
action is not his own advantage but that of the ruler, then the agent is indeed a slave an 
useless to himself. (TTP, 201) 
 The paradox of the slave is precisely the juxtaposition of these two seemingly contradictory 
statements. On the one hand, individuals constantly seek means conducive to their preservation. 
This is a principle that “no one can fail to forget” (TTP, 198). But the slave is defined as an 
individual who is precluded from seeking their ‘good’. The slave is “useless to himself” 
because he does not calculate his own advantage. Indeed, the “purpose of his action” is 
determined by a command imposed from without. But this raises a paradox: that one’s 
rationality can be retained at the expense of one’s reasonableness. In other words, the slave is 
indicative of the possibility whereby what one seeks, what one judges to be useful, merely 
expresses the utility of something external. If the slave reveals the absence of calculating one’s 
utility, then this deeply problematises the convergence of Spinoza’s metaphysics and politics. 
It would show that natural right is severely limited by precluding the capacity of individuals to 
act within the political by seeking out their utility.    
I think this poses a challenge, and at least deeply problematises, the claim that Spinoza rejects 
the contractarian tradition. Here, Hobbes will argue that civil society can only be founded on 
the agreement of mutually consenting subjects, and that this requires transferring one’s natural 
                                                          
8  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1926), see Book 6.  
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right to self-preservation. Spinoza is very clear in rejecting this picture. In a well-known letter 
to Jarig Jelles, Spinoza summarises the key difference between the political theory of Hobbes 
and his own.9 The chief difference, Spinoza adduces, lies in the fact that “I always preserve 
natural right intact” (Ep50). He continues: “and only allot to the chief magistrates in every state 
a right over their subjects commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of the 
subjects.” (Ep50) Spinoza thus explicitly disassociates himself from the contractarian tradition. 
There is no pactum separated from relations of power; no right that transcends an immanent 
politics. But is the figure of the slave the exception to this?   
Hobbes also provides an account of individuals constantly seeking out their advantage. But he 
infers very different results. This is plainly illustrated in Chapter 1 of the De Cive: in virtue of 
the necessity to escape the war of all against all, “it is more rational and gives more assurance 
of our preservation if we make use of our present advantage to build the security we seek for 
ourselves by taking a guarantee”.10 It has become almost ubiquitous to view Spinoza’s natural 
right as either an “eccentric” version of Hobbes’ own, or inversely, to view Hobbes’ natural 
right as essentially Spinozist had he developed his thoughts consistently. This expresses the 
same point: that Spinoza discloses the truth of politics; that one’s right can never be 
surrendered, and everyone actively seeks out their advantage. In this respect, how does one 
account for the latent possibility of the slave, which seems to suggest reason’s limit?  
This paradoxical formulation of the slave has gone largely unnoticed in Spinozist literature. On 
the one hand, Susan James offers an argument that relies on the distinction, as Spinoza himself 
articulates it, between the subject and slave.11 This understanding of the slave is set-up in 
contrast to a people’s capacity to institute a collective or common good that expresses their 
interest. In this way, the subject’s obedience is mobilised in accordance with a self-legislating 
activity. The slave is thereby the condition of being subject to the arbitrary will of an external 
power, where one’s interest is never guaranteed. Frederic Lordon’s Willing Slaves of Capital 
                                                          
9 Benedictus de Spinoza, “The Letters”, trans. Samuel Shirley, in ed. Michael L. Morgan, Complete 
Works: Spinoza (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 891-892. Hereafter cited in-
text with abbreviation (Ep).   
10 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, trans. Richard Tuck, ed. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 30. 
11 See Susan James, “Freedom, Slavery, and the Passions”, in ed. Olli Koistinen, The Cambridge 
Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 223-242. See 
also Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 122. 
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addresses the problem of the slave by focusing on the intransitive nature of desire.12 The whole 
problem for Lordon is that individuals are defined as constantly seeking out (or calculating) 
their ‘good’, and yet precisely what they seek out is always ‘given’ through determinate social 
relations. This approach acknowledges the definition of the slave as being determined to act 
against one’s better interest. Lordon identifies this as the “passionate automata”.13 But what is 
absent that enigmatic statement; namely, that the slave ‘cannot see or do what is good for him’. 
In other words, my interpretation of the slave differs in this respect: that the invocation of the 
slave is not only defined in the context of the intransitive nature of desire, but what Spinoza 
seems to suggest is that this very condition is indicative of a failure to calculate one’s utility.  
There are two lines of inquiry I shall follow. Firstly, there is the claim that natural right can 
never be renounced, that one cannot surrender their capacity to judge. Yet, the slave would 
seem to be the exception to this; that there is such a figure that can be precluded from seeking 
its utility and thus increasing its power. This leads to our second line of thought. The paradox 
of the slave expresses the problematic situation whereby one conforms to the principle of 
calculative judgement, yet nevertheless effectively fails to seek out their utility. Otherwise put, 
the slave would seem to show that reason can be unreasonable; that what an individual believes 
to be seeking out as their ‘good’ is already subject to an external utility.  
How can one conceive a materialist politics on an immanent political ontology? Raising this 
question is crucial because the paradox of the slave shows that this unreasonableness is an 
ineliminable condition of the political. The paradox of the slave is a matter of being separated 
from one’s power, it is the inability to grasp the conditions that allow one to pursue their power, 
and thus their right. Moreover, if an immanent politics denies any source of judgement beyond 
the here and now, how can a multitude become aware that their very actions are already the 
effect of an external command? La Boetie theorised the enigma of voluntary servitude in 
precisely this respect.14 La Boetie claims that what sustains sovereign authority must ultimately 
come from below. But what perplexed him was how the enigma of servitude is conterminous 
with a forgetfulness of one’s subjection. This seems to resonate with the paradox of the slave, 
which prevents individuals from actively seeking their interest.   
                                                          
12 See Frederic Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire, trans. Gabriel Ash 
(London: Verso, 2014). 
13 Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital, p. 20. 
14 See Etienne de La Boetie, Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, trans. James B. Atkinson and David 
Sices (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2012). 
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The invocation of the slave is contrasted to the free man (homo liber) (E4P66s). What underlies 
this is Spinoza’s account of subjectivity, which we intimated at earlier: defined as the capacity 
to calculate one’s advantage within a nexus of determinative power relations. Spinoza will give 
a more precise name to this: desire (cupiditas). Moreover, if one turns to Part 3, Proposition 9: 
“between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally 
applied to men.” Here, appetite (appetitus) refers to the conatus: our capacity for self-
preservation. Desire is therefore the conscious application of our conatus (“appetite with 
consciousness thereof”) (E3P9s). More precisely formulated, desire is a specifically human 
capacity that is inseparable from the faculty of judgement, in which we look for what is most 
conducive to preserve our existence: it is thus a human affair.  
The figure of the free man, in contrast to the slave, is characterised by knowledge which enables 
us to make the transition from passivity to activity, thus overcoming our subjection to external 
affections that determine us to act against our best interests. Freedom, for Spinoza, does not 
imply abstracting oneself from the causal order of nature, rather, the condition of freedom is 
understanding what determines one to act: it is a recognition of necessity.  
This is possible because Spinoza’s political ontology is thoroughly materialist. As Spinoza 
informs us in the introduction to the Political Treatise: “I have taken great care not to deride, 
bewail, or execrate human actions, but to understand them.” And this is possible because they 
are “inevitable, and have definite causes.”15 This is what is presupposed by the coupling of 
right and power. It is tantamount to collapsing the difference between one’s sovereign right to 
act and their existence (that is, desire). Spinoza’s God/Nature thus radically disposes with 
transcendence and teleological conceptions of the human; that is, anything that points beyond 
the here and now. Consequently, this displaces the original intention to exclude transcendence 
back toward the subject. The horizon of the political now becomes a matter of how subjects 
constitute themselves. Right (jus) being reduced to the effectuation of one’s power (potentia) 
within a network of relations that determine what one can do in a given situation. Otherwise 
put, it substitutes the imperative to uncover a natural basis of how one ought to act (or how 
civil society ought to be constituted) for a hermeneutics of how power is transposed, configured 
and re-configured, across an immanent plane. Calculative judgement is thus linked to 
knowledge of the causal order of nature.  
                                                          
15 Benedictus de Spinoza, Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2000), p. 34. Hereafter abbreviated in-text with chapter and paragraph: (TP:1.3). 
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The slave, however, is “led solely by emotion or opinion”, and “performs actions whereof he 
is entirely ignorant” (E4P66s). Here, Spinoza imports two traditions. Firstly, the slave is closely 
associated with the akratic [ἀκρασία] figure, as one who acts against their better judgement; 
indeed, as one who is, literally, powerless (ἀκράτος). Secondly, the faculty of calculative 
judgement, in conjunction with the knowledge of Nature, draws upon the Epicurean rendition 
of phronesis: the form of practical reasoning related to contingent situations.16 The problem 
that arises is the seemingly asymmetrical alliance between a political theory founded on a 
naturalistic conception of the cosmos. This question has been brought to my attention precisely 
because the slave discloses an indeterminacy concerning natural right. Spinoza will tell us that 
we seek objects not because they are ‘good’, but because they are useful, and therefore they 
are ‘good’ (E3P9n). But insofar as one judges that an action is to their interest, it seems that 
Spinoza requires an external criterion in order to judge the slave as an akratic figure. Thus, 
would it not seem that Spinoza has assumed a detached standpoint in order to devalue the slave 
from the outset? That Spinoza can judge the slave qua slave at all would seem to privilege 
knowledge for a few wise: those who know better. Who determines that the actions of the slave 
are not in accordance with his or her best interests? Moreover, can we take Spinoza’s preference 
for the statesman over the philosopher in all sincerity if the statesman shares in the prejudices 
of the people, and vice versa? Indeed, the statesman acts on what is expedient. Thus, there 
seems to be a schism between what Spinoza would have us believe, regarding his implicit 
devaluation of the slave, and the effectual reality, in which the slave judges – a la Hobbes – 
that it is in one’s interest to rescind judgement, precisely in order to secure the preservation of 
life.  
If the slave is part of the constitutive framework of natural right, then it would seem we are 
trapped in a circle. The possibility of the slave cannot be refuted without presupposing a model 
of conduct, which is already given through Spinoza’s intrinsic devaluation of the slave: a 
judgement of judgement. This leads me to the second line of inquiry; namely, the role of 
phronesis, which is precluded for the slave. This can be traced back to Book 6 of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, in which the faculty of phronesis designates the type of wisdom 
dependent on contingent circumstances. The privileging of practical reason constitutes the 
backbone of the materialist tradition. But this tradition had indeed come very far; it was 
                                                          
16 For an analysis of Spinoza’s principle of the calculation of utility and its connection to the 
Epicurean phronesis see Dimitris Vardoulakis, Authority and Utility: Democracy in the TTP 
(forthcoming). 
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Machiavelli, above all, who transformed it into a political principle: a far cry from its original 
meaning as the pursuit of ataraxia (peace of mind).17 The chief obstacle to the fulfilment of 
peace of mind, according to the teaching of Epicurus, is the fear borne of the gods, and in order 
to overcome this fear it is necessary to realise that they are wholly detached from our worldly 
affairs. This implies that the world of the here and now can be explained naturally, for if this 
were not the case, if the gods could intervene at any moment, the mind would be in a constant 
state of perturbation. In order to achieve ataraxia, one must reject creationism.  
But the pursuit of ataraxia entails that one escapes the burdens of public life. It is, in other 
words, essentially apolitical. One is led to ask: insofar as overcoming the fear of nature is 
possible for the individual, or for the followers of Epicurus in his ‘Garden’, how does one 
understand its viability as a political theory, indeed, when it extends to the multitude as a 
whole? In other words, the slave poses a challenge in how to conceive right and power as co-
extensive upon an immanent political ontology.  
Spinoza’s conception of natural right, designated by the co-extensivity of right and power, has 
the status of a univocal statement, that is to say, it expresses the ineluctable truth of politics. 
And yet, the explicit identification of the slave in Chapter 16 of the TTP interiorises the 
possibility of calculative judgement overcoming itself. This is both astounding and profoundly 
ambiguous. It is tantamount to internalising the slave as an ineliminable tendency. Indeed, if 
the slave precludes one’s capacity to seek out their utility by transforming their own conditions, 
how is one to understand Spinoza’s claim to preserve natural right?  
Our investigation hitherto can be summarised as such. Firstly, the slave signifies a rupture of 
Spinoza’s account of desire and thus natural right. Yet, this would belie what is most 
paradoxical, for Spinoza’s account of desire stands on its claim to universality. In virtue of this 
claim, however, the figure of the slave must already be in conformity with its logical premise; 
it is already included in the definition of natural right, and thus cannot signify an aberration.  
Chapter 1 will develop this problem through reading Leo Strauss. I will show that the paradox 
of the slave can be understood as the limitation of reason. For Strauss, the political question 
par excellence is whether human life can be ordered according to the unaided powers of reason, 
or whether there remains an intractable dependency of being ‘revealed’ the ‘good’ life. This is 
                                                          
17 Alison Brown provides an analysis of the Epicurean revival through Machiavelli. See Alison 
Brown, The Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2010).  
10 
 
the alternative between reason and revelation, but this alternative is coeval with difference 
between philosophy and the politics. According to Strauss, the philosophical life can only serve 
a critical function; it is essentially destructive. For this reason, philosophy alone cannot ground 
the properly human life because it cannot sustain a basis for commitment. Strauss never 
explicitly refers to the slave. However, if the paradox of the slave poses the limit of reason, 
then it would seem to confirm Strauss’ position.  
Chapter 2 will focus on the threat of the slave as a positive function. Here, I will advance the 
thesis that the slave’s failure to calculate, his unreasonableness, is the threat of destruction that 
motivates individuals to act in the political. In this sense, commitment does not presuppose a 
dependency on faith, but arises from the precariousness that the slave imposes on the political 
from within. The key to understanding this is the role played by fortune.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Leo Strauss and the Limits of Reason: The Paradox of the Slave and the Necessity for 
Revelation. 
 
Although Leo Strauss never explicitly refers to the slave, his thesis cannot do without it. What 
concerns Strauss is the modern break with what he understands as the classical natural right 
tradition. This begins with the ascendance of nonteleological natural science, which expels any 
ultimate reference beyond the here and now. The political is thus guaranteed through the means 
of an unassisted reason. However, Strauss avers that reason is limited because it cannot sustain 
what is proper to human life without a dependency on faith. Does the slave’s failure to 
calculate, his unreasonableness, confirm Strauss’ suspicions? Let us return briefly to the 
description of the slave in order to draw out its connection to Strauss. 
In Chapter 16 of the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza’s formulation of natural right (jus 
naturale) is coeval with the exercise of the calculation of utility. This principle is fundamental 
to conceiving human action within the political. Spinoza gives us an example of how this 
principle operates with the case of the highway robber: 
Imagine that a highwayman forces me to promise to give him all I have, at this demand. 
Since my natural right is determined by my power alone, as I have already shown, it is 
certain that if I can free myself from him by deceit, by promising whatever he wants, I 
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may by the law of nature do so, i.e., I may fraudulently agree to whatever he demands. 
(TTP, 198) 
In this context the calculation of utility is framed in terms of its capacity to break an agreement. 
It does not matter whether the judgement in question emanates from “certain reason” or “out 
of mere belief”, what matters for Spinoza is that individuals are continually seeking out their 
advantage; seeking out, that is, means conducive to increasing their power to act. The word 
‘continually’ must be taken in the strongest sense: “the mind, both in so far as it has clear and 
distinct ideas and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being” 
(E3P9). And this it does over an “indefinite period of time”.  
The extrapolation of this principle, the calculation of utility, is thus a fundamental political 
precept. To pursue one’s advantage is to modulate one’s power. This principle of human action 
is then eminently political; it presupposes the possibility of transformation and social upheaval 
in all its ambivalence. But this very general illustration is rendered problematic from the point 
of view of the slave; that is, when the calculation of utility is denied; when one cannot see or 
do what is good for oneself. More precisely stated, the condition of slavery pertains to an action 
for which the utility gained is external to the individual. The slave is literally “useless to 
himself” because the reason for its action is not sought out in terms of its own advantage.  
But to acknowledge the full extent of what is a stake one must draw attention to Spinoza’s 
opening remarks in Chapter 17. This is where the paradox of the slave is given its full 
significance. The chapter opens with what experience teaches very clearly: that “no one will 
be able to transfer his power and (consequently) his right to another person in such a way that 
he ceases to be a human being” (TTP, 208). Yet, what emerges is a notion of state power that 
wields an enormous influence over individuals. Indeed, even though a people will retain their 
natural right, “which therefore depend upon no one’s will but their own”, their actions 
nonetheless conform to the commands of the sovereign power. As Spinoza tells us: 
There are numerous reasons why someone decides to carry out the commands of a 
sovereign power: fear of punishment, hope of reward, love of country or the impulse of 
some other passion. Whatever their reason, they are still deciding of their own volition, 
and simultaneously acting at the biding of the sovereign power. Just because someone 
does something by their own design, we should not immediately infer that they do it of 
their own right and not that of the state. Whether moved by love, or compelled by fear, 
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to avoid some bad consequence, they are always acting under their own counsel and 
decision. (TTP, 209) 
Here, Spinoza shows that it is possible to act from one’s volition and exercise one’s own 
judgement, and yet “simultaneously” act perfectly in accordance with what the sovereign 
power decrees. This is precisely the paradox of the slave. One will always retain their faculty 
of judgement, but in this case without the presupposition of praxis; that is, without 
reasonableness. In other words, the calculation of utility is deprived of its capacity to break 
agreements. Spinoza uses the Hebrew State as an example. Through the daily practice of 
ritualised obedience, the Israelites could not distinguish freedom from slavery. Indeed, “to 
people wholly accustomed to this […] surely no one could have desired what was forbidden, 
only what was prescribed.” (TTP, 224) 
The figure of the slave then precludes the possibility of increasing one’s power. Spinoza hints 
at this in the Preface to the Theological-Political Treatise, asking why people fight for their 
servitude as if they were fighting for their liberty (TTP, Preface, 6). It seems to show that reason 
can be unreasonable. This accounts for the seemingly contradictory statements in the beginning 
of Chapter 17: that one exercises their judgement and yet the good/utile sought is always 
already mobilised within the framework of obedience. This makes it difficult to separate the 
immanent powers of desire, which tend towards the expansion of the individual’s activity, and 
the transcendent powers of coercion and control. Instead, the slave poses the question of the 
limits of reason, that is, of how individuals maintain their own subjection: acting as if the 
purpose of their action is to their advantage, and hence useless to themselves.  
This dilemma is the focal point in Chapter 5 of the Theological-Political Treatise, where 
Spinoza discusses the purpose of ceremonies and historical narratives. The example of the 
Hebrew State enables Spinoza to show how the appeal to myths and imaginary narratives 
strengthens obedience to the sovereign power. Thus, these institutions are framed in terms of 
their utility. But they do more than this: their effectiveness lies in the production of compliant 
subjects; that is, to ensure individuals are not simply coerced, but subordinate themselves. As 
Spinoza explains in the context of Moses’ founding of the Hebrew State: 
This then was the purpose of the ceremonies, that they [i.e. the people] should do nothing 
at their own discretion and everything at the command of another, and should confess by 
their every action and thought they did not exist in their own right at all but were entirely 
subject to someone else. (TTP, 75) 
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Are the production of myths, historical narratives, or rituals, necessary to inculcate obedience? 
Chiara Bottici points out that these are necessary insofar as the many are not capable of 
submitting themselves to the public good on rational grounds.18 What is required is supplement 
that can secure life and preserve the body politic. Indeed, Spinoza consistently reminds us that 
most people are devoid of reason: “men are led by blind desire more than be reason” (TP 2.5) 
And to ensure maximum obedience these institutions must be imagined as omnipotent.19 This 
is the “highest secret” that Spinoza speaks of in regard to monarchical government (TTP, 
Preface, 6). 
But the slave raises the stakes. The failure to calculate one’s utility, reason’s unreasonableness, 
brings to fore the non-contemporaneity of reason’s limit. In order to develop the implications 
of this, it is necessary to identify the problem of the slave as coeval with Spinoza’s political 
immanence. If the production of myths and imaginary narratives are essential for the ordering 
of the passionate life, then does Spinoza’s metaphysical rejection of the transcendental, which 
dispels of any standard of judgement beyond the here and now, presuppose that individuals are 
already capable of seeking their own good/utility? It presupposes that the slave, which suggests 
the limit of reason, is already excluded.  
This would seem to render Spinoza’s philosophy as something very distinct from his politics. 
In other words, while his philosophy is content in divulging the illusions of a hierarchical 
world, his politics is contemptuous of many, who require reassuring myths. Is Spinoza’s 
philosophy “elitist” in contrast to his “politics”, which aims only at the bare minimum of 
preserving the State against the passionate life?20 But most importantly, is the slave the 
concealed fulcrum of this structure? 
This question assumes centre stage in Leo Strauss’ project of reawakening the perennial tension 
between reason and revelation. This dichotomy persists throughout Strauss’ career, 
culminating in the metaphorical alternative between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’: between the life 
guided by the unaided effort of reason and the life in faithful obedience the revealed Law.21 
Strauss is compelled to raise this dichotomy because he understood Spinoza’s philosophy as 
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representative of reason’s failure to refute the central tenet of orthodoxy. Reason could not 
refute revelation because it could not justify itself. The philosophical account, according to 
Strauss, is no more demonstrable than the life ordered on the basis of the revealed Law.22 It is 
out of this basic posture that Strauss will argue for the failure of an immanently conceived 
politics, that is, a materialist politics. But the failure to refute revelation means, for Strauss, that 
there persists in irreducible tension between ways of ordering life: unaided reason and faithful 
obedience. This tension cannot be resolved because they are in perpetual conflict. For Strauss, 
human life presupposes commitment that can only come from a relation to faith. Spinoza’s 
immanent politics thus poses a challenge insofar as it denies this necessary framework. The 
crux of the problem, for Strauss, is that Spinoza must presuppose that individuals are already 
capable of mastering their affairs on the basis on an unaided reason. But the slave would seem 
to question this. Is the repression of the slave indicative of an intractable dependency on faith? 
This ambivalence stems from the narrative that stresses the ontological domain of immanence. 
The consequence of this is clear enough: insofar as reality does not exhaust one substance, no 
order can reside outside of its causal network. Without a transcendental basis, and the 
production of finality that it supports, the whole structure of religion is called into question. 
Jonathan Israel is one such author who has forcefully acknowledged the implication of Spinoza 
metaphysical presuppositions. The thrust of Israel’s argument, laid out in his revisionist tome 
Radical Enlightenment, insists on revaluating the Enlightenment era on two planes. Firstly, he 
asserts a key distinction between two strands of Enlightenment thought. On the one hand, there 
stands the restrained, ‘moderate’ Enlightenment which, although driven by the aspiration to 
“conquer ignorance and superstition” through means of philosophy, nonetheless deemed it 
necessary to “preserve and safeguard what were judged essential elements of the older 
structures.”23 In other words, it was a matter of retaining the fundamentals of Christian 
orthodoxy by limiting reason’s destructive impulse. In contrast is the ‘radical’ Enlightenment, 
which “rejected all compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing structures 
entirely”.24 It was this faction alone that espoused democratic values, prescribed the wholesale 
rejection of theological superstition and supernaturalism, and proclaimed reason as the only 
guide in human life.  
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Although Israel acknowledges the existence of a double Enlightenment, divided on the question 
of what role reason ought to play in the social sphere, his analysis is also underscored by a 
conviction that the Enlightenment period was fostered, above all, by philosophical concepts 
rooted in the emerging mechanistic world-view of the seventeenth century. And at the heart of 
this lies Israel’s Spinoza. As the key progenitor of the Radical Enlightenment, “no one else 
[…] remotely rivalled Spinoza’s notoriety as the chief challenger of the fundamentals of 
revealed religion”.25 Although it is not Israel’s intention to reduce the enormous intellectual 
and cultural shifts of the Enlightenment to the systematic philosophy of Spinoza, for these “no 
doubt originate in vast social forces”.26 But the argument that Israel implicitly presents is that 
philosophy itself had become a veritable tool of social transformation. 
But the Spinozist camp was subject to criticism, not only from the pulpit of eccleasitical 
authority, but from within philosophy itself. The ‘moderate’ Enlightenment also saw the 
extreme anti-religious strictures of the radical exponents as dangerous to public morality. While 
the radicals rejected any compromise that sought to accommodate the new sciences to the 
principles of revealed religion. Indeed, they had no intention of curtailing intellectual probity 
for the sake of retaining the socially cohesive function of religious dogma. Indeed, the 
“rigorous mechanism” of the new sciences “entailed the subordination of theology and Church 
authority to concepts rooted in a mathematically grounded philosophical reason.”27 
It is this uncompromising attitude, drawing its support from a materialist lineage dating back 
to Epicurus, that amounts to a wholesale repudiation of the supernatural, revealed knowledge, 
superstition, in effect, it threatened the very foundation of Christian theology. Thus, Israel 
clearly recognises the fundamental antithesis between reason and faith that is born of Spinoza’s 
ontological presumptions.  
While Israel’s reassessment of the Enlightenment narrative has the intention of unearthing its 
neglected grounding in the philosophy of Spinoza, one wonders: on what basis does Israel 
assert the superiority of the radical Enlightenment over its moderate variety. On the one hand, 
there is the Spinozist camp and its unrelenting critique of religion and theological dogma as 
the supressed engine room of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, there are the 
representatives of the moderate camp (namely, Montesquieu, Locke, Voltaire), who attempted 
a viable synthesis of reason and faith. But can one unambiguously justify a preference for the 
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radicals?  Indeed, can a justification be sustained without ineluctably privileging the modality 
of immanence? It would seem that the answer to this is already given in advance: one should 
merely accept Spinoza’s metaphysical assumptions. But can we accept these principles 
unproblematically, or does the challenge of the slave – of reason’s unreason – call into question 
such an enterprise?  
Israel clearly recognises the centrality of Spinoza’s interpretation of the Scriptures for his 
broader critique of religion. Indeed, “no other part of Spinoza’s assault on authority, tradition, 
and faith proved so generally disquieting as his Bible criticism.”28 But what proved so 
unsettling? One would have to turn to the Tractatus, where Spinoza links his broader objective 
– which is to “extricate ourselves from […] theological prejudices and the blind acceptance of 
human fictions as God’s teachings” – to his method of interpreting the Biblical Scriptures (TTP, 
98). Spinoza proposes something which had never been suggested before: he defines his 
method as analogous to the interpretation of nature. That is, he proposes a naturalistic 
understanding of the Bible that can trace its meaning and origin to humanly comprehensible 
motives. As Samuel Preus points out, the crucial step in this is to “dispense with the fiction of 
divine authorship and to treat the Biblical authors and editors as real authors”.29 As Spinoza 
himself affirms: the rule of interpretation must proceed from the “natural light of reason which 
is common to all men, and not some light above nature or any external authority”. (TTP, 117) 
Returning to Preus, Spinoza’s point of departure is thus to deny the “dogmatic fictions about 
divine authorship and textual infallibility”.30 In this way, Spinoza’s ontological monism 
severely delimits revelatory knowledge by subsuming it within a naturalistic apparatus.  
Thus, turning to Chapter 2 of the Theological-Political Treatise: the prophets had “only a more 
vivid power of imagination”. (TTP, 27) What is implicit in this definition is the erasure of the 
distinction between ‘revealed’ truths that exceed the scope of human intelligence and scientific 
truths that are ascertained through the light of natural reason. Israel imports the full significance 
of this revolutionary understanding of the Bible, which “redefines Bible exegesis as a science”, 
reducing it to the order of Nature, that is, to the realm of philosophy.31 Thus, Spinoza does not 
so much deny the reality of revelation as to devalue its epistemological claim as the prophets 
themselves understood it. By rendering such knowledge explicable through natural causes, the 
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immutable character of the truths ascertained through revelation are thus stripped of their 
sacred value, and reconfigured as a product of the imaginative-passionate life; that is, 
superstition. Gilles Deleuze’s thoroughly immanent reading of Spinoza recognises the full 
significance of this move. Thus, Spinoza’s philosophy replaces the transcendent values, which 
underpin revelation’s moral imperative, with the “qualitative difference of modes of 
existence”.32 Which is to say, the professed knowledge of the prophets can only be understood 
as an inadequate form of expression within an already immanent, naturalistic framework.   
Let us return to the question we posed earlier; namely, on what basis can one justify a 
preference for the radical dimension of Spinoza’s thought without implicitly reiterating his 
metaphysical presuppositions. Insofar as one privileges the ontological modality of immanence 
it would seem that one cannot but come to a critique of religion. The difficulty stems, not from 
Israel’s historiographical method, but from the distinction between a ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ 
strain of Enlightenment. The distinction represses the slave. It conceals the possibility that 
reason can function perfectly well, but be simultaneously deprived of its most radical capacity; 
namely, its reasonableness, its praxis. Otherwise put, the slave’s mode of judgement is nothing 
but what the sovereign power decrees, it thus lacks the capacity to break agreements. This is 
far from radical, it is pacifist.  
Catherine Malabou is clearly attuned to the instability of this distinction.33 Focusing, rather, on 
Deleuze’s expression/impression bifurcation, she questions the rigid privileging of the 
rationality that is implied in the former over its fundamental other; that is, revelation.34 Indeed, 
the concept of expression, and its relation to impression, is tacitly accepted in Israel’s 
preference for the radical strain of Enlightenment thought. Expression denotes the mode of 
knowledge that renders the prophets susceptible to interpreting Nature as an immutable ‘truth’. 
It is this knowledge through revelation that is systematically devalued in accordance with 
Spinoza’s metaphysical principles; thus “while expression is adequate, revelation is 
inadequate.”35 Malabou thus clearly understands the “unequal regimes of representation” that 
characterise the antagonistic relationship between philosophy and religion. This is something 
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implicit in Deleuze’s thesis, while adumbrated in Israel’s own position. Malabou thus raises an 
important question: whether one can sustain a rigid demarcation between the ‘truths’ of 
philosophy and revealed religion, with the subsequent devaluing of the latter, without erasing 
the ontological fact that revelation is a “divine necessity”. It must be so, otherwise it could not 
have happened as it did. Thus, insofar as revelation is inextricably a part of the divine order of 
God, Malabou questions the thesis that the origin of the sacred can be legitimately attributed 
to a lower-order mode of human intelligence, for “Spinoza missed the immanent dimension of 
transcendence”.36 The general problematic that is brought to light helps to inform our own 
critical inquiry; namely, whether one can unambiguously accept the radical dimension of 
Spinoza’s thought, that is, his metaphysical principles which are the precondition of his critique 
of religion, or is there an undisclosed fissure located in the very fabric of Spinoza’s immanence. 
In other words, and moving beyond Malabou’s thesis, has Spinoza neglected the immanent 
unreasonableness of the slave; that is, the inability to calculate one’s utility? 
Indeed, as I have already intimated, the problematic figure of the slave exposes a profound 
ambivalence hitherto concealed within the ubiquity of Spinoza’s metaphysics; that is, it 
discloses the ineliminable threat of reason’s indispensable relation to faith. 
The thesis that the Enlightenment is divided into two strands, radical and moderate, with the 
former eagerly defended by Israel, is a programme that is anticipated by the early work of Leo 
Strauss.37 Strauss’ interpretation of his own ‘Radikale Aufklärung’ is wedded to his analysis of 
Spinoza’s Bible science, and more broadly, the theoretical juncture of what he identifies as the 
‘theological-political predicament’. Continually returning to this theme, Strauss is keenly alert 
to the structural shortcomings of the modern Enlightenment project that sought to emancipate 
humanity from the clutches of theological prejudice. Like Israel, he recognises the fundamental 
dislocation of religious authority that emanated from Spinoza’s metaphysics and disseminated 
through the disciples of the radical Enlightenment. Central to Strauss’ oeuvre is thus the 
perennial conflict between reason and revelation. But unlike Israel, Strauss is hesitant: he is 
deeply suspicious of whether the modern critique of religion can plausibly justify its claims, 
and more pertinently, whether such claims are politically sustainable.   
~~~ 
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In order to understand the profound challenge posed by the figure of the slave, I will turn to 
Strauss’ project that seeks to question the roots of modern liberalism, and how it was shaped 
by the modern critique of religion. Although Strauss consistently returns to the eternal struggle 
between reason and revelation (which he also designates under ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’), he 
is primarily concerned with how the insoluble nature of this tension exposes the profoundly 
unstable ground upon which the inherited ideas of the Enlightenment are constructed. More 
precisely, Strauss contends that the value assigned to reason, its elevation to the highest form 
of knowledge, which excludes any reality beyond it, has furnished modern rationalism with a 
self-destructive impulse. But how could it be that the path of reason, advocated by the radical 
Enlightenment, and so ardently defended by Israel, would be so disturbing for Strauss? 
Turning to the Introduction of his Natural Right and History, Strauss discerns the momentous 
decision of early modernity to found a political theory and model of human action in a 
mechanical conception of the universe. But this decision, the “naturalistic solution”, Strauss 
writes, found itself at an impasse:  it could not “give an adequate account of human ends by 
conceiving of them merely as posited by desires or impulses.”38 For Strauss, this is the 
inevitable consequence that is borne of conceiving political action upon a strictly immanent 
ontology, which denies any value beyond the here and now. What results is a dissymmetry: 
can a political/ethical programme that seeks to break the cycle of fear and superstition be viably 
conceived on an immanent plane? In other words, does the slave posit the necessary limit of 
reason; that is, an intractable dependency on faith?  
These questions are crucial precisely because Spinoza invokes the figure of the slave, which 
raises the issue of reason’s limitation through the failure to calculate one’s utility. It raises the 
suspicion that, in stark contrast to the conclusions drawn by Israel, modern rationalism cannot 
extricate itself from the primordial struggle between reason and revelation. According to 
Strauss: “the more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism.”39 If the slave shows 
the limitation of reason (that is, reason without the presupposition of praxis), is this already 
imbedded in the effort to secure to secure life in faith? This is the question that I want to focus 
on by way of the conclusion drawn from Israel.  
But to make this clearer, it is necessary that we investigate the roots of Strauss. When he says 
that the “contemporary rejection of natural right […] is identical with nihilism”40, this reveals 
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a theoretical lineage that can be traced back to Jacobi’s critique of Spinoza and the broader 
Enlightenment movement, resulting with the pantheism controversy in the late eighteenth 
century. Despite its almost trivial beginnings – Lessing’s Spinozism – the effect of this 
controversy was far-reaching. According to Frederick Beiser, the pantheism controversy 
inflicted a severe blow to the hegemony of reason. Indeed, it was Jacobi who single-handedly 
“succeeded in casting doubt upon the central dogma of the Aufklärung: its faith in reason.”41 It 
was Jacobi who foresaw, lurking beneath the hegemony of reason, a destructive impulse. Put 
simply: reason can not guarantee itself because it has no necessary stake in-itself.  
In his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Strauss provides us with only a single reference to Jacobi. 
However, it is particularly revealing: 
Even if all the reasoning adduced by Spinoza were compelling, nothing would have been proven. 
Only this much would have been proven: that on the basis of unbelieving science one could not 
but arrive at Spinoza’s results. But would this basis itself this be justified? It was Friedrich 
Henrich Jacobi who posed this question, and by so doing lifted the interpretation of Spinoza – or 
what amounts to the same thing, the critique of Spinoza – on to its proper plane.42 
I have included this passage in its entirety, not only because it explicitly details his indebtedness 
to Jacobi, but by way of this connection it adumbrates the issues we have hitherto raised; 
namely, that Israel’s privileging of the ontological modality of immanence by definition 
excludes any reality beyond reason. But can this claim be legitimately adhered to within the 
logical constraints of ratiocination. This is the question Strauss imports from Jacobi – but to 
what extent? There is his 1921 doctoral dissertation, entitled The Problem of Knowledge in the 
Philosophical Doctrine of Friedrich H. Jacobi, which gives us a clue to his indebtedness to 
Jacobi. However, a closer investigation of this link requires us to bring to light the motive that 
undergirded Jacobi’s critique.  
Jacobi’s critique of the authority of reason emerges out of his notorious accusation of Lessing’s 
apparent Spinozism. This was an affront to Moses Mendelssohn who, being an ardent supporter 
of the moderate Enlightenment and personally acquainted with Lessing, was well-aware that 
such a claim was akin to a moral indictment. Indeed, Spinoza had been anathematised for over 
century, his name was inextricably linked to the fowl tone of ‘atheism’. Thus, the accusation 
that Lessing may have been a secret admirer of Spinoza would have grave ramifications for the 
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reputation of Lessing. The debate that emerged gave Jacobi a platform to voice his concerns 
that the Enlightenment’s universalisation of reason is fundamentally flawed.  
As Steven B. Smith points out, Jacobi was concerned with the Enlightenment fixation with the 
principle of sufficient reason.43 This principle dictates that every situation can be made 
explicable through a chain of causation. To highlight this, Jacobi sets his sights at the key 
materialist principle, nihil ex nihilo est: “for if a series is not to arise from nothing, it must be 
infinite absolutely.”44 It is this system, elevated to an ethical and political schema, that underlies 
Spinoza’s philosophy. However, what is profoundly defective, according to Jacobi, is that all 
rationalistic systems of metaphysics (Spinoza’s representing its most consistent application) 
commit a fatal petito principii, for they cannot establish their own premise: “Pure reason is a 
taking hold that only takes hold of itself.”45 Indeed, anything that exceeds human rationality is 
“changed into nothing” and reflected back, absorbed, by the subject; “Thus, the Human spirit, 
since its philosophical understanding will simply not reach beyond its own production, must, 
in order to penetrate into the realm of beings and conquer it with its thought, become world-
creator.”46 
Strauss reiterates this line of argument in Natural Right and History when criticising 
modernity’s attempt to “replace opinions about the whole by knowledge of the whole”, thus 
leading “to the dogmatic disregard of everything that cannot become an object […] for the 
knowing subject.”47 These objections raised by Jacobi appear in his Letter to Fichte (1799). 
Criticising the latter’s idealism, which seeks to reunify reason following Kant’s antinomies, 
Jacobi describes Fichte’s idealism as a “materialism without matter”, indeed, an “inverted 
Spinozism”.48 Fichte had confirmed, according to Jacobi, the inevitable consequence of an 
unaided reason that can not ground its own assumptions. 
This poses a fundamental dilemma. The philosopher is concerned with examining and 
speculating upon the enduring principles that justify our place in the world; whether it be 
politics, religion, morality, and so on. But rational inquiry, at the same time, gives rise to 
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scepticism. There is thus a conflict between the principles that govern life, and the 
philosophical attitude which inevitably undermines the foundations of these principles. 
Frederick Beiser aptly summaries this: “What we find necessary to believe in order to act within 
our world often proves to be unacceptable when we examine it according to our critical 
reason.”49 This consequence of this is clear: if we do not sincerely believe in the principles that 
we hold high above us, we will not act on them. As Jacobi writes: “If there are only efficient, 
but no final, causes, then the only function that the faculty of thought has in the whole of nature 
is that of observer”.50 The result is that one must choose between affirming a source of vitality 
that exceeds the here and now or accept the treacherous path of nihilism; as Jacobi tells us: 
“Man has this choice […] and this choice alone: Nothingness or a God. If he chooses 
nothingness he makes himself unto a God”.51  
The dilemma that Jacobi thus recognises, and that would remain quintessential for Strauss’ 
perspective, is the insoluble tension between two antithetical codes of life: faith and 
philosophy. However, because the life of reason cannot establish its own ground, anymore than 
a life that recognises a transcendent God and final causes, it must presuppose an act of faith; 
that is, a decision that cannot be brought to light within reason. Jacobi’s answer is the concept 
of a salto mortale, which he addresses in conversation to Lessing, and amounts to a leap out of 
the irrationalism that stems from reason’s unevident presupposition into faith.52   
This argument plays a vital role for Strauss’ critique of Spinoza. The new philosophy that 
emerged in the seventeenth century, adopting the mechanistic world-view of Newton and 
Galileo, alongside the materialist thesis that rejects creationism, would impart a radical 
reconfiguration of man’s place in the world. The denial of a teleological conception of the 
human means the effort to conceive a model of human action is invested in reason: “man’s end 
is not natural, but rational”.53 Thus, by importing Jacobi’s reproach against the Enlightenment’s 
universalisation of reason, Strauss remains sceptical of whether man’s denouncement of the 
otherworldly was altogether justified, for “philosophy, the quest for evident and necessary 
knowledge, rests itself on an unevident decision, on an act of will, just as faith does.”54 
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According to Daniel Tanguay, if our allegiance to reason is an act of faith, then that would 
amount to a “death sentence” for the Enlightenment project. Indeed, the entire effort of Strauss’ 
later writings is an attempt to think through this fundamental dilemma.55 Thus, for Strauss, the 
modern project to liberate man from theological prejudices is held in a state of permanent 
abeyance insofar as it cannot refute the orthodox premise on its own grounds. Only through 
means of “laughter and mockery” could philosophy succeed in the refutation of orthodoxy.56 
By recognising Jacobi’s critique of the groundlessness of reason, Strauss goes a step further by 
importing its full ethical and political consequences. The conflict between reason and 
revelation – or, faith and philosophy – is in the first instance political. This is because it bears 
its significance on the question of how to erect a just social order. Thus, the fundamental 
question for Strauss is this: 
whether men can acquire that knowledge of the good without which they cannot live their lives 
[…] by the unaided efforts of their natural powers, or whether they are dependent for that 
knowledge on Divine Revelation. No alternative is more fundamental than this: human guidance 
or divine guidance. The first possibility is characteristic of philosophy or science in the original 
sense of the term, the second is presented in the Bible. The dilemma cannot be evaded by any 
harmonisation or synthesis. For both philosophy and the Bible proclaim something as the one 
thing needful, as the only thing the ultimately counts, and the one thing needful proclaimed by 
the Bible is opposite of that proclaimed by philosophy: a life of obedient love versus a life of free 
insight.57 
By importing Jacobi’s thesis that reason rests on an unevident ground, thus necessitating an 
article of faith, Strauss is able to construe two antinomic roots at the heart of the Western 
tradition. Strauss is adamant on this point. In a series of lectures given in 1952, published under 
the title Progress or Return, Strauss reiterates the insoluble nature of the conflict: “no one can 
be both a philosopher and a theologian”. Indeed, the “very life of Western civilisation is the 
life between two codes, a fundamental tension.”58 But for Strauss there is no reprieve for 
reason’s ‘death sentence’. Despite its self-inflated significance, reason cannot demonstrate its 
first principles, for this would require a standpoint beyond ratiocination. Strauss is thus 
sceptical of whether the autonomous rational faculties of a multitude is capable of justifying 
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political authority. This deep suspicion remains central to his writings. Thus, in the 1951 
preface to the Political Philosophy of Hobbes, he proclaims: 
I had seen that the modern mind had lost its self-confidence or its certainty of having made 
decisive progress beyond pre-modern thought; and I saw that it was turning into nihilism, or what 
is in practice the same thing, fanatical obscurantism.59 
For Strauss, the emergence of the “modern mind” is coeval with the Enlightenment critique of 
religion, heralding the distinctly modern phenomena of “political atheism”.60 Indeed, “No 
premodern atheist doubted that social life required belief in, and worship of, God or gods.”61 
By ‘premodern’ Strauss is implicitly referring us to the Ancients – which he will come to be 
known as ‘orthodoxy’. Both Greek philosophy and the Bible agree as to the overall need for 
morality in social life. The Ancients, according to Strauss, did not believe that a solution to 
political philosophy could be sought solely on the basis on unaided human effort; that is, 
morality required a transcendent guarantee. It is this recognition that was repressed by modern 
rationalism. 
According to Strauss, modern political atheism arises in response to its inability to refute the 
orthodox position. As Heinrich Meier points out, Strauss’s revival of the insoluble opposition 
between faith and philosophy discloses the “truly Napoleonic strategy” of the Enlightenment 
project which suppressed the impregnable fortress of orthodoxy.62 Thus, for Strauss, the 
modern Enlightenment project substitutes the primacy of the otherworldly for a stable 
mechanism that can ensure the actualisation of the State. Modern political atheism makes man 
a clay to be moulded upon. Indeed, by “deliberately lowering the goal of politics”, it is possible 
to transform man as he is simply given through the right institutions. Thus, 
What you need is not so much formation of character and moral appeal, as the right kind of 
institutions, intuitions with teeth in them. The shift from formation of character to the trust in 
intuitions is the characteristic corollary of the belief in the almost infinite malleability of man.63 
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This “trust in institutions” is concomitant with the general lowering of standards. Indeed, the 
effectual realisation of the State takes precedence over the hypothetical improvement of the 
human condition. For Strauss, this means overturning the original intent of philosophy, which 
was open to the “humanising quest for the eternal order.”64 This point is crucial for it 
adumbrates the nihilist consequences, drawn from Jacobi, that Strauss foresees when political 
authorship is invested in the rational capacities of a multitude.  
The consequence of this, and this is the essential point that Strauss takes from Jacobi, is that 
life requires commitment. But the possibility of commitment is eroded insofar as its grounding 
in faith is uprooted. For Strauss, the modern solution of this insoluble tension – between reason 
and man’s dependency on faith – is displaced into the role of institutions. It is these institutions 
that are invested with the “teeth” necessary to grapple with the “infinite malleability of man”. 
And it is here that the slave reaches its highest pitch in confirming Strauss’ thesis. If the slave 
reveals the limit of reason, that is, reason without practical reasonableness, is this already an 
effect of the lowering of the goal of politics. In other words, not only does the slave pose the 
question of the limits of reason, but this dependency would seem to be already at work in 
institutions that deprive individuals of the capacity to seek their advantage.  
As Steven B. Smith suggest, Strauss’ concern is not so much to affirm the necessity of a salto 
mortale as to defend the claims of orthodoxy: the most pertinent of which being the 
“immutability of the Law” as communicated through revelation.65 Thus, while Spinoza 
represents the effort to enact a “wholesale repudiation of the very pillars of the Law”, Strauss 
is committed to the insoluble opposition between reason and revelation, for philosophy itself 
rests on an “unevident decision”: the life of free insight is thus no more necessary than a life 
guided by faith in the truths ascertained through revelation.  
~~~ 
The basic problem of the slave forces us to re-examine whether Spinoza’s radical immanence 
can viably achieve the underlying motive in the Tractatus; namely, to liberate philosophy from 
its subordination to faith. This is because, according to Strauss, philosophy cannot justify its 
own necessity. It thus rests on a petito principii: it presupposes, using Malabou’s language, that 
the “ontological fact” of revelation is already excluded. In other words, Spinoza’s ethical 
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programme stands or falls on the claim to have secured the rational capacities of a multitude. 
But if the slave follows from Divine necessity it would seem to equally justify the 
renouncement of one’s rational faculties in favour of obedience to the Law. If this is true, the 
theoretical circularity that pertains to the slave would seem to corroborate Strauss’ scepticism 
that reason cannot extricate itself from its dependency on faith. In order to further understand 
this, I propose turning to Chapter 9 of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion. Here, Strauss pronounces 
the implications of this circularity.  
According to Strauss, this circularity, in its most basic formulation, stems from the fact that 
Spinoza’s politics and his metaphysical assumptions (that is, his radical immanence) are 
inseparable. In other words, natural right is equally afforded to reason as well as the passionate 
life. Hence: “Each person’s natural right therefore is determined not by sound reason but by 
desire and power.” (TTP, 196) Otherwise put, the form of obedience that pertains to the slave, 
such that it precludes the possibility of calculating one’s interest, is not excluded from the 
constitutive apparatus of natural right: it remains as an ontological fact. Thus, what becomes 
clear for Strauss is that there is “no immediate bond of union between his moral theory and his 
theory of natural right: he must refrain from enjoining the precipitous path to his goal in life on 
the common run of men, or even considering it as open to them.”66  
Indeed, if Spinoza’s “moral theory” consists of securing the freedom to philosophise from its 
subordinate position to theology, then Strauss is implicitly alluding to the slave; for it follows 
from Spinoza’s radical immanence that the path of reason is no more necessary than the 
unqualified obedience to the Law; that is, the very renouncement of one’s rational faculties. 
Moreover, that the “precipitous path” to sound reason is denied to the many follows from 
Divine necessity. Which is to say, Spinoza cannot avoid ascribing to the masses the fate of the 
imaginative-passionate life. Thus, according to Strauss, insofar as natural right begins, not from 
considering the human condition as it is given, but from the God, he cannot but fall into a 
circularity. Indeed, 
The fundamental assumption on which Spinoza’s political theory is based has not yet been reached. 
There are two ways of human striving after self-preservation: the way of the multitude guided only 
by their passions and the way of the wise who are led by reason. Both ways have the same natural 
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right. Politics, however, in so far as it is not prepared to start from Utopian assumptions, may take 
only the first way into consideration.67 
 That the politician must take the first way into consideration – that is, man as he is given – is 
conterminous with the effort of modern political atheism to “deliberately lower[ing] the goal 
of politics”. In order to effectually realise the State, the politician must arrange civil society 
upon that part of human striving that can be reproduced with a reasonable degree of certainty. 
Thus, according to Strauss, “Spinoza becomes the equal of Hobbes”, for whereas Spinoza’s 
“doctrine of natural right is primarily metaphysical or cosmological […] Hobbes is throughout 
positive or limited to man.”68  
 Spinoza becomes the equal of Hobbes because he must affirm that the substratum of human 
life is the passionate life. The basic order of human conduct is determined by our primary 
relation to world; namely, our “deficiency of knowledge”. (TTP, 63) The inability to acquire 
knowledge of the total causal whole develops a mode of knowledge that is fundamentally 
inadequate: partial, confused, and fragmented. It puts one at the mercy of chance encounters. 
It is this which begets fear of nature’s incessantly fluctuating order. From this “fear is the root 
from which superstition is born, maintained and nourished.” (TTP, Preface, 4) Moreover, the 
unstable ordering of life that is born of superstition then requires a mechanism to secure itself. 
It is this that accounts for the function of religion, which “teaches people to despise reason”. 
(TTP, 98) 
Spinoza thus states what is required. His aim is to divulge the theological illusions which create 
the very condition of slavery. But all his work is still ahead of him. Otherwise put, it begs the 
question: how can the figure of the slave, trapped in the nexus of superstitious thoughts, be 
overcome? Following Strauss’ line of argument, Spinoza’s “moral theory” can only be made 
to conform with his radical immanence on the presupposition that the slave is already excluded. 
But the ontological fact remains. Only until, as Strauss writes, the “abstract opposition between 
the multitude and the wise is relinquished”, and only when it “proves possible that the people 
can free itself from superstition”, only then can the free State become an effectual reality.69 
By reading Strauss in conjunction with the slave, the question that seems to force itself upon 
us is how to escape this circularity. This is precisely where a critique of Strauss becomes 
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necessary. Ivan Segré’s recently translated Spinoza: The Ethics of an Outlaw, provides such a 
criticism. Its original title, Le manteau de Spinoza, refers to the hole in Spinoza’s hooded coat, 
a physical vestige of an attack on his life. But more than that, a reminder of the hatred his 
philosophy inspired against him. The basic premise of text is then to uncover the motives 
behind this hatred. According to Segré, it stems from the fact that Spinoza advocates the 
“original sin” of “raising man above the Law’.70 What is asserted here is the tacit identification 
of the slave; for the slave’s obedience arises, not from the ability to ‘see’ what is good (or, 
useful) in a command, but from an affection that has already determined the necessity of 
obedience. This is the implied difference between the ‘subject’ and the ‘slave’ in the Chapter 
16 of the Tractatus; hence, for Segre: 
There are people who are virtuous through their obedience toward the Law – men dominated by 
emotions – and there are others – philosophers – who are virtuous not because that is the Law, 
but because they love virtue and are able to recognise what is best about it (my italics).71 
The philosopher is ‘above the Law’ (not contrary to the Law) because he is guided by reason, 
thus recognising the utility in obedience. Or, using Spinoza’s language: “any agreement can 
have force only if it is in our interest, and when it is not in our interest, the agreement fails and 
remains void.” (TTP, 199) Thus, the ‘subject’ – or, the philosopher – is guided by autonomous 
insight, which implies an understanding of the necessity of any obedience.  
In Segre’s text, Strauss becomes the subject of consistent methodological criticism. Segre 
opposes the exegetical method that Strauss employs in Persecution and the Art of Writing. It 
is supposed, according to Strauss, that the act of ‘writing between the lines’ is indispensable 
for philosophers living under the threat of persecution; that is, societies which do not guarantee 
independent thought. It gives rise to a literary technique that is “addressed, not to all readers, 
but to trustworthy and intelligent readers only.”72 This is the interior, or implicit (esoteric), 
meaning of the text; it can only be brought to light by the attentive reader, and only “thoughtful 
men are careful readers.”73  
But why does Strauss resort to an exegetical method that, according to Segre: “introduces the 
possibility of making the text say what you really want it to say”? Assuming this is true, that 
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reading between the lines may serve to reflect the intentions of the reader, one would then have 
to examine Strauss’ underlying motives. One the hand, there is the insoluble conflict between 
reason and revelation, that is, the conflicting claims of Athens and Jerusalem. ‘Athens’ stands-
in as a metaphor for philosopher, whereas ‘Jerusalem’ refers to the Law as communicated 
through revelation. In Spinoza’s words: the “aim of philosophy is nothing but truth, but the aim 
of faith […] is simply obedience and piety.” (TTP, 184) There is thus no “interaction and no 
affinity” between these two opposing codes of life.  Strauss rejects any attempt to find a 
synthesis or mediation between the two; for there is “no possibility which transcends the 
conflict between philosophy and theology, or pretends to be a synthesis of both.”74 
Segre shows, however, that the antinomic relation that Strauss confers in the difference 
between Athens and Jerusalem – or, the life guided by autonomous reason as opposed to the 
life in obedience – is deliberately equivocal, for Spinoza already suggests a mediation: the 
historical arrival of Christianity; since “Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouth-piece 
of God”. Indeed, while the prophets perceived their revelations as “precepts and teachings”, 
emanating from an anthropomorphic conception God. This is due only to a lack of 
understanding; that is, the inability to recognise the necessity of what determines us to act. 
Spinoza identifies Christ as a kind of revolutionary figure, for he communicated “things as 
eternal truths and not as commandments. Hence, he freed them from servitude to the law and 
yet in this way also confirmed and stabilised the law, inscribing it deeply in their hearts.” (TTP, 
64) Spinoza is then recognising in Christ a revolutionary project to overcome the condition of 
slavery, and that this project is analogous (or, a precursor) to philosophy. Following Segre’s 
line of argument: one would then have to introduce a third-term between Athens and Jerusalem; 
namely, that “Christianity was itself the Trojan Horse for philosophy.”75 But when we turn to 
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, the picture is quite different: 
But obedience requires that we “know” God to exist as the fount of all justice and mercy, and 
this “knowledge” is not true but adapted to the mental range of the vulgar, and – this is of major 
import – indeed runs counter to the real meaning of the philosophic parts of Scripture. The 
concern of the Scripture as a whole can therefore only be to bring about active obedience to God, 
and this obedience expresses itself only in works of justice and charity. This obedience may be 
                                                          
74 Leo Strauss, “Progress or Return?”, p. 44. 
75 Ivan Segré, Ethics of an Outlaw, p. 70. 
31 
 
justified in two ways, which stand directly opposed to each other: philosophically, or vulgarly. 
But what counts is not the justification; but the works.76 
That the Scriptures were necessarily adapted to the “mental range of the vulgar” is the explicit 
argument presented in the Theological-Political Treatise; hence, the “Biblical teaching 
contains no elevated theories or philosophical doctrines but only the simplest matters 
comprehensible to even the very slowest.” But both the Scriptures and philosophy promote the 
same path to salvation as consisting in “works of justice and charity”, for the “entire Law 
consists in just one thing, namely love of one’s neighbour. This universal ethics is also what a 
life guided by autonomous understanding obligates: “to defend other people’s rights as their 
own.”  The common root is the fact that our rational faculties can never be surrendered; that 
natural right is always preserved. The difference pertains to the way in which this ‘truth’ of 
reason is communicated: The Bible simply asks: ‘what must I know’, where philosophy 
compels one to ask: ‘what can I know’.  
What is perplexing, however, is that Strauss denies any point of contact between obedience 
justified ‘philosophically’ and obedience justified ‘vulgarly’, for they are “directly opposed to 
each other”. But there is a mediation; namely, the teachings (as opposed to prophesying) of 
Christ and his disciples. This is an obedience that is neither the product of autonomous 
understanding nor subjugation to an immutable Law; rather, one might call it: a ‘step in the 
right direction’ – an effort. Thus, according to Spinoza, the Apostles communicated the 
teachings of Christ on the basis of natural knowledge, not on the “basis of divine command and 
revelation”. (TTP, 157) In other words, inscribed within the very economy of the Scriptures is 
an archive of relations of power: the transition from inadequate to adequate ideas, from 
passivity to an external law to active affection. Indeed, this is the very meaning of reading the 
Bible as a continuation of Nature. As André Tosel points out: “The causal history of Scripture 
belongs, then, to the casual science of Nature.”77 Thus, why does Strauss omit the historical 
rupture of Christianity which, by virtue of imposing itself within the immanent relations of 
power, sought to embrace humanity by liberating it from the particularistic tyranny of the 
transcendental Law, hence mediating between Athens and Jerusalem? In other words, as 
Strauss contends, if Spinoza’s natural right rests on a petito principii, in which his “moral 
theory” cannot be made to conform to his metaphysical assumptions, leading him to beg the 
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question, then why does Strauss ignore the implicit suggestion that an answer has already been 
given, if only in the form of an historical event? 
I believe the answer to this is quite clear. And Segre is right to point this out. Strauss’ 
elimination of the third-term is coeval with his setting-up of the gulf that separates the wise 
few from the multitude. Insofar as this points to a circularity, in which Spinoza’s natural right 
presupposes that the slave is already excluded, then Strauss affirms this only to suspend it 
indefinitely. In other words, it is Strauss who makes Spinoza the equal of Hobbes by denying 
the emancipatory potential of reason, that is, of philosophy. This is because Strauss reads 
Spinoza from the vantage point of the slave. Which is to say, he sees only the limitation of 
reason. In seeing the limitation of reason, the slave adumbrates Strauss’ suspicion that 
philosophy and politics are driven by contrary impulses. Philosophy is the privilege of the ‘few 
wise’ who are able to live in the face of the “naked truth”.78 They recognise that the myths and 
narratives that bind society have no solid-grounding other than the purpose of inculcating 
obedience. For this reason, according to Strauss, society must remain separated from the 
continuous questioning of philosophy.  
If the slave discloses the limit of reason, it is because it reveals the point at which commitment 
begins. In other words, the failure to calculate to one’s advantage is the necessary limit that 
fundamentally orders the political. This is Strauss’ view. Thus, when he invokes the Platonic 
allegory of the cave in his work The City and Man, one can only read it in view of the slave: 
The cave dwellers, i.e. the non-philosophers, see only the shadows of artefacts. That is 
to say, whatever they perceive they understand in the light of opinions sanctified by the 
fiat of legislators, regarding the just and noble things, i.e. of fabricated or conventional 
opinions, and they do not know that these their most cherished convictions possess no 
higher status than that of opinions.79 
In other words, “they do not know” that the purpose of their actions is already determined in 
advance by the “fiat of legislators”. This is precisely the definition of the slave in Chapter 16 
of the Theological-Political Treatise. But what Strauss is not attuned to is Spinoza’s rejection 
of the free will and Providence, and thus the need to account for human freedom that is neither 
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grounded in a spontaneous will or a finalist view of the world. For this reason, the TTP must 
retain the threat of the slave as the possibility of commitment to the political.   
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CHAPTER 2 
An Interminable Anxiety: The Slave and the Precariousness of the Political 
 
The thesis I want to advance here is an understanding of the slave, not as problematic, but as a 
presupposition of praxis. That is, as a motivation for individuals to act in the political. This is 
important for a crucial reason: Spinoza’s trenchant disavowal of illusory forms of freedom, that 
is, the critique of free will. Spinoza’s earliest critics attacked the absence of human autonomy 
that resulted from a cosmos in which all finite things are determined to act and think in a certain 
way. Strauss is certainly not immune to this tradition, and the slave would seem to adumbrate 
his criticism. Thus, how can Spinoza retain the possibility of transformation and emancipation 
in the field of politics while at the same time excluding any conception of an originary moment 
of freedom? Utilising Spinoza’s language: if “freedom does not remove the necessity of action, 
but imposes it” (TP, 2:11), can we conceive the political as something other than a static being. 
In other words, what concerns us here, is what motivates individuals to engage in practices of 
collective action.  
This is where the slave is indispensable. Spinoza’s politics sharply diverges from his 
contemporaries (in particular Hobbes) in one crucial aspect: that natural right is not excluded 
from the passionate life. Hence, “we recognise no difference […] between those human beings 
who are endowed with reason and others who do not know true reason, nor between fools or 
lunatics and the sane.” (TTP, 192) In other words, the “fools”, the “lunatics”, the passion-ridden 
multitude, and to that we can add – the slave – all have, by right, a stake in the political. This 
move allows Spinoza to invest the political with an interminable precariousness and instability. 
Moreover, this imbues the calculation of utility, the principle whereby each individual seeks 
what is conducive to the preservation of their being, with an intractable fallibility. What 
significance does this pose for the slave? That natural right is afforded to all – which is to say: 
Spinoza begins, not from a preconceived conception of the human, but from God – implies that 
the fragility that is inscribed in the calculation of utility cannot be confined to a minimal sphere 
action (i.e., methodological individualism), but is inseparable from an economy of social 
relations that constitute individuals within the broader collective. In other words, the fallibility 
of judgement (the calculation of utility) presupposes praxis: not only in the sense that it is 
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always already determined within the social, but also in the sense that the very instability it 
introduces imposes itself as a constitutive element within the field of social relations.  
And this is the significance of the slave; namely, that it intensifies the dimension of 
precariousness that Spinoza inscribes in the political. Again, the slave is defined as one who 
“cannot see or do what is good”. What this suggests is that, not only is the calculation of utility 
subject to miscalculation – “for to err is human” – but that the absence of seeking one’s 
advantage is also written into the political; that is, the renouncement of judgement is 
inseparable from the constitutive apparatus of natural right. To put it in more precise terms, the 
slave is indicative of the possibility whereby: “if the purpose of the action is not his own 
advantage but that of the ruler, then the agent is indeed a slave and useless to himself.” (TTP, 
201) Otherwise put, in this case the ‘good’ that an individual seeks is not sought autonomously, 
but is determined in advance in relation to passivity: one is ‘revealed’ what is ‘good’. The slave 
does not ask: ‘what can I do’ but ‘what must I do’.   
Following Leo Strauss’ interpretation in his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, the slave would 
seem to call into question the extent to which a multitude can be considered the subject of 
politics. That is, the slave challenges the capacity of a multitude to seek their advantage 
autonomously, disclosing an immanent dependency on faith; a faith that is as necessary as 
philosophy. This adumbrates Strauss’ thesis that Spinoza’s materialist politics cannot realise 
its ethical goals without extricating itself from his radical immanence. Only until it can be 
proven that a people have an equal share in the calculation of utility, and only until all have the 
capacity to ‘see or do what is good’, will Spinoza’s political and ethical goals conform to his 
metaphysical assumptions. Thus, according to Strauss, the gulf that separates the ‘wise few’ 
from the vulgar masses, which Spinoza is forced to accept, cannot but become the political 
‘fact’ par excellence. Only the ‘wise few’ have reached the summit of reason, and are able to 
calculate their ‘good’ autonomously, without a relation to passivity. Thus, the ‘wise’ alone 
have a stake in the political: it is their right alone to order it from above.   
The figure of the slave is thus coeval with what Spinoza identifies in the Preface to the 
Theological-Political Treatise as the “highest secret of monarchical government”, which is to 
“keep men deceived […] so that they will fight for their servitude as if they were fighting for 
the own deliverance” (TTP, Preface, 6). However, in contrast to Strauss, the slave does not 
annul the possibility of a materialist politics founded on a radical immanence. Rather the slave 
augments Spinoza’s need to account for how the calculation of utility can have any stake in 
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social transformation and emancipation. This is because the slave is not denied natural right. 
What this means is that the failure to ‘see or do what is good’ for oneself, and the privation of 
knowledge it implies, always already has a stake in the political. It is in this sense that the slave 
reinforces commitment to the political. It compels individuals to intensify their efforts, 
endowing them with the responsibility to act and engage with one’s surroundings. Since 
“nothing is more advantageous to man than man”, this form of commitment finds its practical 
acme through engagement with others.   
To put this in more concrete terms, Spinoza’s politics is set apart insofar as the passionate life 
is not something to be excluded but integrated into the dynamic flux of social relations. It is 
this irreducible precarity that is necessary to account for a conception of freedom that is 
construed neither negatively (i.e. absence of constraint),80 nor as an originary moment of action 
(i.e., free will), but as an expansion of powers. On this basis, the slave’s failure to ‘see or do 
what is good’, as a mode of judgement that is fundamentally passive and thus unstable, is 
embedded in the constitutive relations of the body politic. Hence, by presupposing praxis, the 
slave amplifies the effort to strengthen the calculation of utility. 
In order to understand precisely what is at stake, one must understand that the slave’s passive 
form of judgement is already woven into the web of social relations that determine its actions. 
It is in this respect that Etienne Balibar’s concept of ‘transindividuality’ will prove 
indispensable. Balibar develops this conceptual apparatus as way of intervening between two 
opposed perceptions of the political. One demands that a notion of individuality be given in 
advance, such as the ‘atomistic’ individuals in Hobbes’ state of nature, and where society (if it 
exists at all) becomes a secondary consideration. The other demands that the community be 
conceived as a pre-established totality, or a functional whole, into which individuals are 
subsumed. Balibar’s ‘transindividuality’ denies the primacy of one over the other by stressing 
the irreducible relationality between the individual and the collective. Individuality would then 
be understood as a process, in which singular things do not act from a preconceived matter, but 
are part of a nexus of interdependent singularities striving to persist; they thus constitute and 
are constituted by their environment. 
But to comprehend the ‘transindividual’ conditions of existence is also to think human 
autonomy as commensurate with the materialist axiom par excellence: that nothing comes from 
nothing. The key to understanding this is that the compositions that define individuals, and its 
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relational dependence on the broader circulation of ideas and affects, is inherently unstable. 
This is because there is no pre-established harmony that guarantees the certa ratio of the parts 
that compose an individual form (forma). It is this precarity and vulnerability which compels 
individuals to act. And it is in this sense that I intend to understand the slave’s passive mode of 
calculation (as one who awaits, who is revealed what is ‘good’ as opposed to actively seeking 
it out) as an intensification of this precariousness.  
 
~~~ 
 
How can we better frame the precarity that the slave’s failure to calculate the ‘good’ imposes 
on the political? Again: “a man at the mercy [obnoxius] of his emotions [affectus] is not his 
own master but is subject to fortune [fortuna]”. In the Scholium to E5P4, Spinoza tells us that 
the “majority appear to think that they are free to the extent that they can indulge their lusts”. 
Because of this, they are “ruled by fortune rather than by themselves”. The virtuous person, 
whose life is ordered by rational knowledge, enjoys human freedom because “[he] is more able 
to be guided by reason and control his appetites” (TP: 2.20). 
The significance of fortune in this context closely resembles the Machiavellian relationship 
between virtù and fortuna; here is what Machiavelli says in the well-know chapter 25 of The 
Prince: 
I am not unaware that many have thought, and many still think, that the affairs of the world are 
so ruled by fortune and by God that the ability of men cannot control them. Rather, they think 
that we have no remedy at all; and therefore it could be concluded that it is useless to sweat much 
over things, but let them be governed by fate. This opinion has been more popular in our times 
because of the great changes that have taken place and still to be seen now, which could hardly 
have been predicted. When I think about this, I am sometimes inclined, to some extent, to share 
this opinion. Nevertheless, so as not to eliminate human freedom, I am disposed to hold that 
fortune is the arbiter of half our actions, but that it lets us control roughly the other half.81 
What is at stake here is the concept of fortune, which is the invisible centre of Spinoza’s unique 
understanding of freedom. In Chapter 3 of the Theological-Political Treatise, fortune is defined 
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as: “the direction of God inasmuch as he governs human affairs through external and 
unforeseen causes” (TTP, 45). But fortune is not the same as fate: “it lets us control roughly 
the other half”. The other half is virtù. In other words, one cannot separate the capacity to act 
from “external and unforeseen causes”. Fortuna imposes herself on us, motivating us to act, 
and virtù is the skill necessary to seize fortuna.  
Again, this is the invisible centre of Spinoza’s freedom without the free will. It is not a freedom 
which treats the individual as a spontaneous locus of action, nor is the individual swallowed 
into an amorphous whole, which leaves no room for human autonomy. Moreover, just as virtù 
is inseparable from fortuna in Machiavelli’s Il Principe, Spinoza’s account of the calculation 
of utility must also contend with “external and unforeseen causes”. But matters are more 
complicated for Spinoza: there is the slave – who cannot see or do what is good for him; that 
is, the one who is “subject to fortune” because he is at the mercy of the affects. Before drawing 
out the full significance of the role that fortune plays as a motivation for action, let us draw out 
the more precise implications of the slave. 
The slave occupies three locations in each of Spinoza’s major texts: (1) Chapter 16 of the TTP, 
(2) the Scholium to Proposition 66, Part 4 of the Ethics, and (3) Chapter 2 of the Political 
Treatise. In Chapter 16 of the TTP, the slave is defined as one “who cannot see or do what is 
good for them.” Moreover, Spinoza tells us that the slave indicates an action, the purpose of 
which, “is not to his own advantage but that of the ruler”, hence, the slave is “useless to 
himself.” (TTP, 201) But the invocation of the slave in the Scholium to E4P66, which 
immediately follows from the preceding cluster of propositions that identify the principle of 
the calculation of utility. The announcement of the slave is highly suggestive: 
With reference to the strength of the emotions, we shall readily see the difference between the 
man who is guided only by emotion or belief and the man who is guided by reason. The former, 
whether he will or not, performs actions of which he is completely ignorant. The latter does no 
one’s will but his own, and does only what he knows to be of greatest importance in life, which 
he therefore desires above all. So I call the former a slave and the latter a free man. (E4P66s) 
What is at stake here is the imbrication between the slave, judgement, and the circulation of 
affects. The condition of the ‘free man’, that is, the ability to do what one knows to be of 
greatest importance in live, is dependent on Proposition 59, Part 4 of the Ethics: “In the cases 
of all actions to which we are determined by a passive emotion, we can be determined thereto 
by reason without that emotion.” This does not mean that the body and mind are no longer 
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affected, but that reason is able to engage with the passions: to understand the passions is to 
displace inadequate ideas for adequate ones.82 And acting reasonably increases one’s activity: 
it expands one’s capacity to see and do. But: “to act from reason is nothing else but to do what 
follows from the necessity of our own nature considered solely in itself.” What this means is 
that an increase in activity is commensurate with an increase in autonomy: understanding 
enables us to act with reference to our own power.83 In other words, one is able to seek their 
good/utility by asking: ‘what can I do’ as opposed to ‘what must I do’.  
This move cannot be understated. It allows us to grasp how, for Spinoza, sociality is not split 
between the imaginative-passionate life and the reasonable life. There is no gulf that separates 
the ‘wise few’ and the ‘vulgar multitude’. Here, knowledge is instrumental. The end to which 
we act is always the appetite/conatus. Understanding the passions does not expel the affects, 
but restructures them into rational affects.84  
But what is it that the ‘free man’ does which he “knows to be of greatest importance in life”? 
The proceeding propositions are paramount. Indeed, in the Proof to E4P67, Spinoza declares 
that the ‘free man’ [homo liber] “directly desires the good [bonum directe cupit]; that is, to act, 
to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own 
advantage.” I take this to mean that what the ‘free man’ “desire above all”, when guided by the 
dictates of reason, is to recognise that the one thing most needful in life, the one thing that 
ultimately counts, is to seek one’s advantage. Thus, it is not any particular ‘good’ that one 
seeks; rather, the ‘good’ is to seek out one’s utility.85 
This is the essential difference that contrasts to that of the slave: he ‘cannot see or do what is 
good’. It is the difference between preserving one’s being autonomously and submitting oneself 
to a judgement that is given in advance: again, the slave awaits to hear what is ‘good’, is 
revealed, from the superintendent on whose good faith he relies. But this is ultimately illusory 
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because the slave, as Spinoza alludes to in the Preface to Part 4 of the Ethics, is “subject to 
fortune”. What is the status of fortune in this context? 
 
~~~ 
 
This is where the precarity of the slave is crucial to understanding how Spinoza can account 
for a freedom that eschews the illusions of the free will. Instead, Spinoza’s strategy consists in 
conferring upon the political an irreducible element of instability. Indeed, “if human nature 
were so constituted that men desired most of all what was to their advantage, no special skill 
would be needed to secure harmony and trust” (TP: 6.3). This vulnerability compels individuals 
to engage with their surroundings. However, the slave raises the stakes: not only is the 
calculation of utility fallible, but that one is submitted to fortune without virtu.  
Let us examine in more detail the status of fortune. To reiterate Spinoza’s position: fortune is 
defined as “the direction of God inasmuch as he governs human affairs through external and 
unforeseen causes”. To understand the meaning of this it would useful to draw our attention to 
Althusser’s ‘aleatory materialism’. Here, Spinoza is identified as occupying a hitherto 
subterranean materialism, a “wholly different mode of thought”86, that privileges chance (or, 
the random) against the logic of necessity and finalism. But in supporting his claims, Spinoza 
is connected to Epicurus’ defence of atomism and the void, as well as Lucretius’ theory of the 
clinamen. What relation does Spinoza, who argues that all things are determined absolutely 
from God, have to a theory of chance? Indeed, the difficulty is that Ethics rejects contingency: 
“Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a 
particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.” (E1P29).   
Althusser thus begins with the ‘rain’ of Epicurus/Lucretius. Not any kind of rain, but that of 
the “atoms that fall parallel to each other in the void”.87 For Althusser, this provides the 
backdrop to conceiving of the “non-anteriority” of meaning. The Epicurean thesis implies that 
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“before the formation of the world, there was no Meaning, neither Cause, nor End nor Reason 
nor Unreason.”88 Just the atoms and void.  
It is precisely at this moment that the clinamen arrives to interrupt the uniform velocity of the 
atoms. The intervention of the ‘swerve’, which is found in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, is the 
crucial ingredient that forms the world. Hence, 
The clinamen is an infinitesimal swerve, ‘as small as possible’; ‘no one knows where, or when, 
or how’ it occurs, or what causes an atoms to ‘swerve’ from its vertical fall in the void, and, 
breaking the parallelism in an almost negligible way at one point, induce an encounter with the 
atom next to it, and, from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world – that is to 
say, of the agglomeration of the atoms induced, in a chain reaction, by the initial swerve and 
encounter.89 
And from this, 
Every encounter is aleatory, not only in its origins (nothing ever guarantees an encounter), but 
also in its effects. In other words, every encounter might not have taken place, although it did 
take place; but its possible nonexistence sheds light on the meaning of its aleatory being. And 
every encounter is aleatory in its effects, in that nothing in the elements of the encounter 
prefigures, before the actual encounter, the contours and determinations of the being that will 
emerge from it.90 
However, one is led to ask: does the clinamen have any place in Spinoza’s philosophy? It would 
seem not. But in a well-known correspondence with Hugo Boxel, one can find Spinoza’s sole 
reference to the Ancient theorists of the atoms, and thus of the clinamen. Here it is: 
The authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, does not carry much weight with me. I should 
have been astonished, if you had brought forward Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the 
atomists, or upholders of the atomic theory. (Ep56) 
This admission is cited against those who have “invented occult qualities, intentional species, 
substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles”. Vittorio Morfino suggests that this opposition 
can be read co-extensively with Althusser’s primacy of the aleatory over the form.91  
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Let us take a closer look at the letters exchanged between Spinoza and Boxel. On first glance, 
the topic may seem quite frivolous: Boxel asks for Spinoza’s opinion on “apparitions”, 
“ghosts”, and “spectres”. But what is particularly intriguing is its repressed centre. In Letter 
52, Spinoza retorts that belief in ghosts are more likely to resemble the “pastimes of children 
or of fools” and are indicative of the desire to “narrate things, not as they really happened, but 
as they wished them to happen.” (Ep52) However, Boxel’s reply in the proceeding letter reveals 
what is properly at stake. While Boxel claims that the belief in ghosts is proof of the “beauty 
and perfection of the universe”, he proclaims that such reasoning will not “convince those, who 
rashly believe that the world has been created by chance.” (Ep53) But Spinoza makes it clear 
that necessity and chance are in fact contraries: for the “world is a necessary effect of the divine 
nature”. (Ep54)  
But what becomes immediately clear is that the notion of chance that Boxel employs, and which 
Spinoza rejects, is indicative of an unacknowledged centre; namely, the absence of providence, 
the lack of any free Divine will. Indeed, the production of chance is implicitly alluded to in the 
Appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics: “if a stone falls from a roof on to someone's head, and kills 
him”, a religious explanation will attempt to show that the stone was predestined to fall on the 
man, for they will incessantly pursue the series of causes until they “take refuge in the will of 
God—in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance”. Morfino discovers that this example, of the 
falling stone matches Aristotle’s hypothesis that all teleology may indicate nothing more than 
a chance concatenation of necessary events, and thus it only seems like a hidden telos is at 
work.92   
Pierre Macherey refers to the production of chance in this context as a “necessary accident”, in 
the sense that an encounter can only be “explained by causes […] that determine it completely 
without which no part in this sequence appears as the conditions of an internal unity, which 
links all these causes in the framework of an immanent development between them, that is, a 
final movement.”93 In other words, there is no immanent necessity, no “internal unity”, which 
can anticipate an encounter or guarantee the durability of its form: “Hence it follows that all 
particular things are contingent and perishable.” (E2P31corollary) 
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On this basis, Althusser will claim that, for Spinoza, “the object of philosophy is the void.” 
Although the question remains as to whether the void occupies an ontological status94, or 
whether – as Morfino contends – it expresses a rhetorical gesture; that is, as indicating the 
radical absence of any form that precedes and thus guarantees an encounter. But Spinoza’s 
example in the Appendix of Part 1 of the Ethics would seem to inscribe the void with two 
possibilities, as Morfino suggests; a “scientific” and “religious” explanation. It seems that the 
invention of an illusory intention (the “religious” explanation), which is nothing more than a 
“sanctuary of ignorance”, is the outcome of thought that approaches the void; that is, the radical 
absence of any guarantee. What cannot be excluded is precisely this precariousness and 
uncertainty; an interminable anxiety that accompanies the preservation of oneself: a stone 
falling upon one’s head, a chance encounter that exceeds the instruments of rational calculation.  
In this sense, the chance/aleatory encounter manifests an excess of non-totalisable causes. It is 
not a chance attributable to ignorance, but the impossibility of forming an object of rational 
calculation. In other words, what confronts individuals is an irreducible casual nexus that both 
oversupplies and surpasses our instruments of intelligibility.95  
Indeed, Warren Montag applies this same reading from the Appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics: 
“chance is not used in a negative sense to denote a subjective failure of knowledge”, rather, 
“the very notion of God’s will and providence arises from an inability or unwillingness to 
acknowledge the existence of chance encounters”.96 Here, Montag draws attention to Deleuze’s 
interpretation of the clinamen in Lucretius: the point of the matter is not contingency or 
indetermination, but the “impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole”. This is what 
the clinamen manifests, according to Deleuze: “an irreducible plurality of causes”.97 And this 
is why chance, the “necessary accident”, discloses the void, which is nothing other than the 
absence of any transcendent or pre-existing rule.  
The intervention of the clinamen is contingent, not because the encounter that is produced is 
arbitrary, but because there is no pre-ordained direction that guarantees the coming into being 
of an encounter. In other words, to affirm the primacy of the contingent that underlies the 
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necessity of an “accomplished fact”, means recognising the utter absence of any transcendental 
apparatus that precedes the initial encounter. And thus, recognising the void that looms over 
every prospect of a lasting encounter, for no encounter carries its own guarantee. And this is 
why the establishment and preservation of every ‘form’ presupposes praxis, that is, an effort. 
This is why the slave is “subject to fortune”.  
 
~~~ 
 
We have seen thus far that Spinoza draws together freedom and necessity in the absence of 
providence or Divine order. This is premised on the contingency of the world, that is, the 
aleatory encounter that compels individuals to act – that “lets us control roughly the other half”, 
as Machiavelli will say. Hence, as Spinoza’s reply to Boxel suggests: the repudiation of chance 
discloses the heart of what it means to be free in a world where all finite things are determined 
necessarily from Nature. Thus, as Spinoza writes in the Tractatus Politicus, perhaps inspired 
by his exchange with Boxel: 
Yet the more free we conceived man to be, the more we were compelled to maintain that he must 
necessarily preserve himself and be of sound mind, as will readily be granted by everyone who 
does not confuse freedom with contingency. Freedom, in fact, is virtue or perfection; so anything 
that signifies weakness in man cannot be referred to his freedom (TP: 2.7) 
As Morfino puts it in the Introduction to Plural Temporality: “each encounter[s] is necessary, 
though a necessity that, if I may be permitted this oxymoron, is entirely aleatory; that is, without 
a project or a telos.”98 In other words, to necessarily preserve oneself implies, not a negation 
of contingency as such, but the capacity to recognise the aleatory; that there is no pre-
established harmony that guarantees a lasting encounter. Hence, it presupposes a motivation to 
act, that is, an effort/conatus to establish (by seeking out bodies that agree) and maintain a 
successful encounter. It is this interplay – between the aleatory that “lets us control roughly the 
other half” and the effort to seek our advantage – that is primarily at stake in Spinoza’s unique 
conception of freedom. In other words, ethical life requires the admission of contingency; it is 
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what makes motivates action in the political. As Filippo Del Lucchese frames it: “the absolute 
negation of the contingent, on the one hand, and its paradoxical necessity for ethical praxis.”99  
However, it is precisely because of this conception of freedom (forgoing the illusion of a Divine 
will that has our interests sorted out in advance), that the slave’s failure to calculate introduces 
a fundamental precariousness into the political. In other words, reason devoid of the 
instrumental modality of calculation poses an existential threat because it cannot respond to 
the contingent. Indeed, as Spinoza says in the Scholium to E4P66: the slave “performs actions 
of which he is completely ignorant. He is, in other words, at the mercy of the emotions (or, the 
circulation of affects), and is thus “subject to fortune”. The slave is the absence of that crucial 
other half: fortuna without the necessary virtu.  
It is here that one can begin to understand the positive function of the slave. When Spinoza 
defines the slave as the failure to seek one’s utility, what is being posited is an interminable 
threat of destruction. To look at this more closely one must acknowledge the transindividual 
conditions of existence. Conceiving the political in this way avoids structuring the individual 
either as an enclosed ‘atom’ or as simply an effect of a greater totality. Rather, it places the 
onus on understanding the irreducible relationality between individuals and their environment. 
The critical import of this idea is that the political is underscored by ineliminable processes of 
composition and decomposition. To think of the political in this way accentuates its inherent 
precariousness. The effort that is required to maintain, what Spinoza calls, the “certain fixed 
proportion” of bodies is always prone to being ruptured. My contention is that the figure of the 
slave is precisely what accounts for this threat. The slave is the interminable anxiety that 
presupposes praxis. That is to say, the slave is what threatens to rupture social bonds, and it is 
this intractable reality that intensifies one’s commitment to the political and ethical life.      
The notion of ‘transindividuality’, as develop by Etienne Balibar, has its origins in Gilbert 
Simondon’s work on individuation.100 Simondon rejects substantialist ethics that conceives the 
individual as a pre-given matter. This is disposed of in favour of an ontology of relations, in 
which the individual is always a process of becoming, and is thus fundamentally incomplete. 
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In From Individuality to Transindividuality101, Balibar develops this in respect to Spinoza. 
There are three key points he draws on. Firstly, that individuality is the “very form of actual 
existence”, which is to say that every individual is defined by is particular striving or conatus. 
Secondly, that the ‘form’ of an individual is always composed of some parts. And thirdly, that 
the ‘form’ and its constituent ‘parts’ are in constant ‘communication’. The relation between 
individuals and broader collective and social forces is thus ‘fluid’ inasmuch as it is maintained 
by a continual exchange of parts.  
Conservation is nothing but this regulated process of “continuous regeneration”. To say 
that an individual keeps existing is tantamount to saying that it is continuously 
regenerated or reproduced. An isolated individual, having no “exchanges” with the 
environment, would not be regenerated, therefore it would not exist. Right from the 
beginning, what Spinoza implies is that any individual has a need of other individuals in 
order to preserve its form and its existence.102 
This conservation, however, remains precarious insofar as it demands the effort of individuals 
to maintain this “continuous regeneration”. Spinoza’s Proposition 39 in Part 4 of the Ethics 
must be read in the context of utility that is implied: “whatever is conducive to the preservation 
of the proportion of motion-and-rest, which the parts of the human body maintain towards one 
another […] is therefore good.” (E4P39) That this is eminently political is confirmed by the 
proceeding Proposition: “whatever is conducive to man’s social organisation […] is 
advantageous.” (E4P40) These statements are all ordered around the fundamental provision 
that individuals seek their utility, and by doing so – as Balibar frames it in a footnote – “look 
for the conditions in which the cohesion of the parts is secured or even reinforced.”103  
This is where the slave is critical. The continuous exchanges of parts necessary to maintain the 
body is precarious because it forms an “equilibrium which is not fixed, but a dynamic – a 
metastable equilibrium which must be destroyed if it is not continuously recreated.”104 What 
is implied is that the political order is intrinsically precarious if it is not “continuously 
recreated”. But the missing element in this configuration is precisely the figure of the slave. 
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The slave’s failure to calculate, his unreasonableness, is a permanent condition and limit of the 
political: it is the threat of destruction.105 
But we can take this a step further. If the slave’s lack of calculation is the intractable threat of 
destruction, then can this hypothesis be connected to the slave’s paradoxical formulation; 
namely, reason without the presupposition of praxis? To state this more precisely, the slave is 
the possibility whereby what one seeks as their utility is already determined in advance, already 
the utility of something external. In this way, as I have said, the slave is dependent on being 
‘revealed’ what is good. But can the argument be made that this intrinsic threat, the 
ineliminable risk that our judgements are never our own is what motivates individuals to 
commit to the other, to engage with one’s environment?  
In a certain sense, what one seeks at their ‘good’ or ‘utility’ is never first and foremost their 
own. As Jason Read illustrates in The Politics of Transindividuality, human desire is “by 
definition intransitive” insofar as it is continually shaped by the dynamic field of affective 
relations.106 Indeed: “we do not desire a thing because we judge to be good; on the contrary, 
we call the object of our desire good”. (E3P39) The good/utility any individual seeks is defined 
by a history of affective relations. To say that our judgement is affected from without is to 
acknowledge that it gives content to our judgements. In this sense, the calculation of utility is 
never one’s own. However, the slave raises the stakes: it is precisely because of this intransitive 
nature of desire that individuals ‘fix’ upon a determinate object. This indicates the slave as the 
threat of destruction. Indeed, the slave’s unreasonableness is the failure to respond to the 
aleatory.   
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